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THE DISCOVERY REQUIREMENT IN MINING LAW,
CAN IT BE SATISFIED BY GEOPHYSICAL DATA?
By

CARL L.

SANDSTROM*

On August 6, 1945, President Harry S. Truman, then returning
to the United States from the Potsdam conference, electrified the
world with the announcement that 16 hours earlier an atomic bomb
had been dropped in Hiroshima, Japan. Since that date discoveries
and developments in the field of nuclear science, together with the
strained international situation created by the Cold War, have made
the raw materials from which atomic energy is derived a vital national resource. As a result there has been an overwhelming increase
in prospecting for these radioactive minerals.
History books, movies, and in more recent years, television,
have done much to create an image of the prospector of the early
West. The prospector of the uranium boom, however, differs considerably from his counterpart of the "good old days." The passage of
time has brought improvements not only to his equipment but to
his technique. The same cannot be said, however, for the statutes
governing his prospecting activities. They have remained substantially unchanged and the courts have been faced with the task of
fitting new techniques into a framework of old regulations. The
resulting situation was aptly described by the Nevada Supreme
Court when it stated:
The problem is old in a new setting. The rush to a new
strike and the scramble for the most desirable location.
Today the magic word is uranium; the scintillator and the
mineral lamp have taken the place of the prospector's tools;
the airplane and the four-wheel drive truck have reduced
factors of time and distance. The plot, the drama, however,
remain essentially the same; the rush, the location, the
overlapping of claims, the discovery of values, the dispute
and in the orderly resolution of the dispute the principles
of law remain unchanged from the days of the Mother Lode
and Comstock.'
One of the essentials of this regulatory framework is a "discovery of valuable mineral" to establish a valid location on land of the
public domain. 2 The discovery of mineral is the cornerstone of the
location, the foundation of title, and no right exists until such discovery is made.3 Although the statutes clearly state that discovery
is required,4 nowhere do they define the term nor state what is
necessary to satisfy it. Thus, it has been left for the courts to decide
what constitutes a "valid discovery." Though the problem has been
treated in numerous cases, no very precise test had been laid down
even before the development of radiometric prospecting devices.
* Attorney, Chief Counsel's Office, Atomic Energy Commission, Las Vegas, Nevada. The views
expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Atomic Energy
Commission.
1 Berto v. Wilson, 74 Nev. 128, 324 P.2d 843 (1958).
2 Rev. Stat. § 2320 (1875), 30 U.S.C. § 23 (1952).
3 2 Lindley, Mines, § 335 (3d ed. 1914).
4 See note 2, supra.
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The utilization of these newly developed instruments and techniques created additional problems and brought about an increased
need for either a more exact test or standard to be used by the courts
or a legislative revamping of the statutes governing this matter.
The fundamental issue in cases involving discovery of radioactive minerals has been the extent to which radiometric findings
by Geiger counter, scintillator, or allied devices can be relied on by
the locator. The purpose of this article is to examine the results of
several recently decided cases and determine whether the courts
in these cases have established a standard that can be used and
relied on by persons locating claims for radioactive minerals.
I.

THE DISCOVERY REQUIREMENT

The discovery requirement in mining law is a matter of basic
policy and one that is firmly rooted in history. In all ages and all
countries discovery has been regarded as conferring rights or claims
as a reward.5 The prospector went forth in search of minerals accompanied by a promise of reward. When a discovery was made the
discoveror was granted the use of a segment of land and the right
to remove minerals from that land. Discovery was the condition
precedent to the reward.6
Prior to the enactment of the mining statutes by the United
States, the rules and regulations of the California mining camps7
recognized discovery as essential to establishing a valid claim.
When the government acted to formalize the practices of the mining
camps, a provision requiring discovery was included and basic mining law today contains the same provision: no location can exist
until after discovery of mineral within the boundaries of the claim
has occurred.8
The federal government, by this statutory framework regulating location, has established a method by which property rights,
through a patent, can be acquired in a portion of the public domain.
The purpose of such a plan is to facilitate the development of the
natural resources of the nation. The function of discovery is to
insure the government the benefit it seeks, i.e., development of its
mineral wealth and at the same time discourage the bad faith
locator. It is the good faith locator who has made a valid discovery
of valuable mineral and who desires to further develop that discovery who will be rewarded and not the individual who, under the
guise of a good faith locator, but with no discovery, attempts to
obtain title to the land."
That the law requires a discovery of valuable mineral for a
valid location is clear. The reason or purpose for such a requirement
is also clear. There is a lack of such clarity, however, when it comes
to what constitutes a "valid discovery." Nowhere do the statutes
define the term nor state what is required to satisfy it. Since ques5 See note 3, supro.
6 1 Lindley, Mines, 5-38 (3d ed. 1914).
7 O'Reilly v. Campbell, 116 U.S. 418 (1885); Jennison v. Kirk, 98 U.S. 453 (1878); Marshall v.
Harvey Peak Tin Co., I S.D. 350, 47 N.W. 290 (1890); 1 Lindley, Mines, 43 (3d ed. 1914).
8 17 Stat. 91 (1872); 30 U.S.C. § 23 (1952). State statutes customarily contain the same requirement, e.g. Wyo. Stats. § 30-6 (1957).
Wasky v. Hammer, 223 U.S. 85 (1912); Shoshone Min. Co. v. Ritter, 87 Fed. 801 (9th Cir. 1898);
Long v. Robinson, 148 Fed. 799 (9th Cir. 1906).
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tions of discovery have been held to be questions of fact, 10 it has
been left to the courts to determine from the evidence presented in
each case whether the requirement has been met. Considerable litigation on this subject through the years has resulted in the evolution of the so-called "rule of discovery" which states: In order for
a location to be valid there must be a discovery of mineral under
such circumstances and of such character as would justify a person
of ordinary prudence in the further expenditure of time and money
with a reasonable prospect of success in developing a profitable
mine." Federal and state courts as well as the Department of Interior have accepted this as the general
rule to be applied in deter12
mining the validity of a discovery.
It can readily be seen that this rule is neither the epitome of
exactness nor specificity. That courts have applied it with varying
degrees of liberal or strict construction is not surprising. The result
is widely varying pronouncements as to what evidence of discovery
is sufficient to allow a prudent man the further expenditure of time
and money to develop his claim. The Supreme Court in the Chrisman case 1 3 said that there must be "reasonable evidence of the fact
either that there is a vein or lode carrying the precious mineral, or
if it can be claimed as a placer that it is valuable for such mining."
What constitutes "reasonable evidence" is a question of fact upon
10 United States v. Ohio Oil Co., 240 Fed. 996 (D. Wyo. 1916).
11 Cameron v. United States, 252 U.S. 450 (1920); Chrisman v. Miller, 197 U.S. 313 (1905).
12 Castle v. Womble, 19 L.D. 455; Jefferson v. Montana Copper Mines Co., 41 L.D. 320 (1912).
13 Chrisman v. Miller, see note 11 supro, at 323.
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which equally learned courts and juries have reached conflicting
conclusions.
What, then, will the courts accept as "reasonable evidence" of
a valid discovery? As in certain other areas of the law a better idea
of what will be accepted can be obtained by considering some of the
evidences which the courts have in the past rejected. This is especially true when considering the problem of whether data obtained
from geophysical instruments will be accepted as "reasonable evidence" to prove valid discovery of radioactive minerals. Certain of
these holdings as to what does not constitute a valid discovery have
mitigated against acceptance of geological and/or geophysical evidence as sufficient proof of the discovery of valuable mineral.
In United States v. Iron and Silver Mining Co., 14 the United
States Supreme Court, in 1888, rendered an important decision on
this point. In that case the court commented as follows on the
sufficiency of the discovery evidence there presented:
It is not enough that there may have been some indication by outcroppings on the surface, of the existence of
lodes or veins of rock in place bearing gold or silver or
other metal, to justify their designation as "known" veins
or lodes. To meet that designation the lodes or veins must
be clearly ascertained, and be of such extent as to render
the land more valuable on that account, and justify exploitation. 15
Following this early pronouncement by the Court there followed a series of rulings which have since been cited and quoted in
nearly every discussion involving the discovery requirement. This
series of cases established the rule that mere indications of valuable
mineral, however strong, are insufficient16 and that it is the actual
finding of the mineral in rock in place, as distinguished from float
rock, that constitutes the discovery. 17 Also, evidence which merely
suggests a possibility that valuable mineral may, on subsequent exploration, be found to contain ore of great value has been held
unacceptable.1 " The Supreme Court stated with some emphasis and
considerable clarity in King v. Amy Silversmith Mining Co.:" "Locations resting simply on conjectural or imaginary existence of a
vein or lode within their limits shall not be allowed. A '2location
can
0
rest only upon an actual discovery of a vein or lode.
Thus the rule that only an actual physical exposure of valuable
mineral within the limits of the claim would satisfy the discovery
requirement. 21 This rule and its application to unexposed deposits
based on surface indications and geological deductions has been
summarized as follows:
Title to the claims is sought essentially on account of
their possible value for certain unexposed deposits supposed
to exist a considerable depth beneath the surface, and hay14 128 U.S. 673 (1888).
15 Id. at 683 (Emphasis added).
16 Iron Silver Co. v. Mike & Starr Co., 143 U.S. 394 (1892).
17 Book v. Justice Mining Co., 58 Fed. 105 (D. Nev. 1893); Dalten v. Clark, 129 Cal. App. 136,
18 P.2d 752 (1933).
18 Chrisman v. Miller, note 11, supro; Iron Silver Co. v. Mike & StarrCo., note 16, supra; United
States v. Mobley, 45 F. Supp. 407 (S.D. Cal. 1942).
19 152 U.S. 222 (1894).
20 Id. at 227 (Emphasis added).
21 2 Lindley, Mines, § 336 (3d ed. 1914); Miller v. Chrisman, 140 Cal. 440, 73 Pac. 1083 (1903);
Whiting v. Stroup, 17 Wyo. 1, 95 Pac. 849 (1908).
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ing no connection, as far as shown, with any deposits
appearing on the surface. The exposure, however, of substantially worthless deposits on the surface of a claim; the
finding of mere surface indications of mineral within its
limits; the discovery of valuable mineral deposits outside
the claim; or deductions from established geological facts
relating to it; one or all of which matters may reasonably
give rise to a hope or belief, however strong it might be,
that valuable mineral deposit exists within the claim, will
neither suffice as a discovery thereon,
nor be entitled to be
22
accepted as the equivalent thereof.
The Court, in the case of Nevada Sierra Oil Co. v. Home Oil
Co., 23 refused to accept the sufficiency of discovery evidence based
on geological inferences and deductions and made the statement
that since indications of a thing are not the thing itself,2 4mere indications of a mineral cannot constitute a valid discovery.
An excellent analysis and review of this 5entire point is given
by Lindley in his work on the Law of MinesY
II.

STATE LAW

DiscovERY

REQUIREMENTS

State laws governing the location and recording of mining
claims on the public domain are a valid exercise of the regulatory
authority permitted under the mining laws.2 6 However, such laws
are valid only to the extent that they are not inconsistent with the
federal laws.27 Therefore, while state law may impose additional
burdens on the locator of a mining claim by way of requiring additional development or discovery work, 28 such laws cannot alter the
minimum requirements of the federal law.29
III.

RECENT COURT DECISIONS

It has been mentioned before that the purpose of the actual
physical discovery requirement before a mining claim is validly
located is to prevent the government from being defrauded. Another reason is to protect the prospector against wholesale segregation of mineral land by locators of spurious claims. It is because of
this that the courts have refused to accept geological evidence as
sufficient to satisfy the discovery requirement of the law. Such evidence has been viewed as merely indicative of the presence of
mineral and as the Court stated in the Nevada Sierra Oil Co. case,3 0
must be rejected since mere indications of mineral do not constitute
discovery of the mineral itself.
The radioactive properties of uranium have made geophysical
prospectors out of almost everyone who can get a Geiger counter or
a scintillator. However, it would seem that such geophysical evidence of the presence of radioactive minerals is in no better position
than strictly geological findings as proof of discovery under the
22 East Tintic Consolidated Claims, 40 L.D. 271, 274 (1911).
2398 Fed. 673 (1899).
24 Cited in Whiting v. Stroup, note 21, supra.
25 See note 3, supra.
26 17 Stat. 92; 30 U.S.C. § 28 (1952).
27 Kendall v. Son Juan Silver Mining Co., 144 U.S. 658 (1892).
28 Erhardt v. Boara, 113 U.S. 527 (1885).
29 Northmore v. Simmons, 97 Fed. 386 (1899); Saxten v. Perry, 47 Colo. 263, 107 Pac. 281 (1910).
30 See note 23, supra.
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mining laws. At least this would be a necessary conclusion from
the judicial precedents recorded over the past 75 years. The several
recent cases discussed below involving such evidence of discovery
should, therefore, be of more than casual interest to persons interested or involved in mining law and especially to those interested
in uranium claims.
The first of these cases, Smaller v. Leach,"I was decided by the
Colorado Supreme Court on October 14, 1957. Discovery was not an
issue in the case but rather it dealt with the validity of a grubstake
agreement based on loan of a scintillator for uranium prospecting.
In the decision, Justice Sutton, speaking for the court, attacked
the practice being used by uranium prospectors wherein large areas
were staked without compliance to the mining law in hopes that
later legal discoveries would validate these claims. He concluded
this "dicta" with the following comment on the absence of either
state or federal legislation that would allow geophysical evidence as
the basis for valid discoveries:
.This court recognizes that no Colorado nor Federal
legislation has yet been enacted to expressly provide for the
atomic era in radioactive mineral locating. No such laws
exist expressly providing that valid discoveries can be made
by radio detection devices, possibly because of the newness
of the subject, or, because of fear of defective instrument,
fraudulent claims, mistakes which may arise, the difficulty
of determining on the ground as to whether a claim has
been validated by discovery, or because not all radio-active
areas are in fact valuable. It also appears that uranium
itself at times may be "inbalance"; viz., not giving off any
than the chemical
count or that count may be different
2
assay, which is the conclusive test.'
The Colorado Supreme Court in this decision indicated that it
would not accept as valid a mineral discovery based on geophysical
evidence but would treat such data as mere indications of mineral
and not the mineral itself.
Shortly after the Leach case was decided, the Wyoming Supreme Court was confronted with the problem that the Colorado
court had refered to in Leach but did not have to answer, i.e., can
there be a valid discovery of mineral based on geophysical data?
31 136 Colo. 297, 316 P.2d 1030 (1957).
32 Id. at 307, 316 P.2d at 1037.
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That was the question
before the Wyoming court in Globe Mining
33
Co. v. Anderson.
In that suit, Globe Mining Co. brought an action to quiet title
to ten lode mining claims located on the public domain. Globe had
discovered a highly radioactive anomaly by means of an airborne
scintillator. The area containing this anomaly was then examined
on foot, the geology determined, and a radioactive count of 2 to 7
times background obtained on all claims. Samples were taken from
three of the claims and chemical assays of the samples disclosed
uranium. Globe then performed the other location requirements
and hired a person to do some work on the claims. Approximately
two years later Anderson entered and located in the same area,
overlapping some of the Globe claims.
The Wyoming Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Parker,
held that Globe had valid claims on only the three claims from
which the chemical assays had been taken, that on the remaining
claims there was no valid discovery and Globe was not entitled to
possession, and that Globe could not question Anderson's attempt
to establish valid claims. As to the seven remaining claims there
was no evidence of sampling or assaying of a "vein, lode, or rock
in place" which prompted the court to say:
Thus there was no evidence of a sampling and assaying
of a vein, lode, or rock in place in Phil #3, 4, 7, 9, 10, 11,
and 12, and, therefore, no discovery on those claims-unless
we recognize the readings of electrical instruments such as
scintillators and Geiger counters as sufficient to support
discovery. This we are reluctant to do, since such counters
while helpful in prospecting for uranium cannot be relied
on as the only test. For instance the plaintiffs' witness
Grant, testifying about his general investigation of the subject, said that in certain areas where the background count
was high an assay showed no uranium. To the same effect
see Ninninger, Minerals for Atomic Energy, 2d ed. pp. 37
and 73. Thus with the exception of Phil #5, 6, 8 there is
no evidence in the record on which to base discovery of a
vein, lode, or mineral bearing rock in place within the limit
of any Phil claim. This is required by both the Federal and
the Wyoming statute relating to lode claims, and the plaintiff is obligated
to sustain the burden of proof in that
34
respect.
The Wyoming court thus concluded that geophysical evidence
in the form of favorable radiometric showings does not alone suffice
to comply with the statutory requirement that "mining claims upon
veins or lodes of quartz or other rock in placebearing ... valuable
deposits" cannot be validly located "until discovery of the vein or
lode within the limits of the claim is located." The court's statement
that scintillator or Geiger counter readings cannot be relied on as
the "only test" is significant, however, in that it indicates that although such geophysical evidence "alone" is insufficient basis for a
valid discovery of mineral perhaps such evidence when accompanied by other "indications" would be sufficient to meet the require33 78 Wyo. 17, 318 P.2d 373 (1957).
34 318 P.2d at 380.
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ment. Just what the court might require in addition to the geophysical information is not indicated.
Rummell v. Bailey,3'5 decided by the Supreme Court of Utah,
was the first case to deviate from the position taken in the Leach
and Globe cases. There the court held that a discovery based on a
reaction from a Geiger counter, plus geological analysis of the immediate area as well as the nature of nearby proven ore bodies was
valid. This was the first example of what a court might accept, in
addition to geophysical data, as reasonable evidence of a discovery.
From the comment of Justice Sutton in the Leach case it would
seem that the Colorado court felt that before geophysical evidence
could be accepted as satisfying the discovery requirement of the
mining law, new legislation would have to be passed permitting it.
For this reason the opinion of the Colorado court in Dallas v. Fitzsimmons,3 6 decided some six months after Leach, was surprising.
The Dallas case involved three uranium claims located on state
land that was open to lease. Discovery on the claims was based on
Geiger counter readings from each claim and a chemical assay from
one of them. Dallas tried to buy the claims from Fitzsimmons, the
locator, and when Fitzsimmons refused to sell, Dallas leased the
land from the state and brought an action to eject Fitzsimmons as
a trespasser on the leased land. Fitzsimmons claimed a right to the
land because of valid lode claims and the trial court held for him.
This was affirmed by the Colorado Supreme Court.
First, it should be mentioned that the fact that the land involved
was state land rather than federal public domain does not alter the
importance of this case to mining law in general. This is true because of the jurisdiction resting in state courts to determine the
right to possession in controversies between rival mineral claimants,
and the similarity between the state and federal requirements. This
is especially true here since the court relied entirely on judicial
precedent which involved the public lands mining laws, and has
not indicated that its decision is predicated on any distinction between the discovery requirements of the state and federal mining
laws.
The court summarized the discovery evidence upon which the
three claims were based as follows:
There is evidence that uranium was found on each
claim by use of the Geiger counter. Assays of the claim
samples from one of the discovery pits showed chemical results up to 1.24% uranium and 0.4% vanadium according to
testimony objected to but not ruled on below.
The record and briefs carefully and ably detail the
lengthy history of just how defendants made this discovery
with a Geiger counter and later had samples from one of
the claims chemically assayed. The assays proved what the
Geiger counter indicated on the ground, i.e., mineralization
sufficient to 37constitute a "discovery" within the meaning of
our statute.
The court in justifying its conclusion that the chemical assay
35 7 Utah 2d 137, 320 P.2d 653 (1958).
36 137 Colo. 196, 323 P.2d 274 (1958).
37 Id. at 202, 203, 323 P.2d at 278 (Emphasis added).
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from the one claim, plus the Geiger counter readings from the
adjoining claims was enough to satisfy the discovery requirement
for each claim said:
Where as here the assay of samples from at least one
of the claims, and all the claims are contiguous, and where
the trial court could and did conclude from the evidence
that the non-assayed claims lie on similar ground, it is not
unrealistic to hold that competent radiometric reactions,
supported by a chemical assay as to part of the claims,
clearly show the presence of uranium on the adjacent
claimed location showing the same or similar radiometric
readings. The latter are then valid "discoveries" under our
statute as much as are outcrops visible to the naked eye.
Such other "discoveries," however, must be capable of
competent radiometric delineation in similar rock in place
or along the same vein or lode. See Smaller v. Leach,
136 Colo. 297, 313 P. 2d 1030, for a discussion of radiometric
discoveries; and compare Rummell v. Bailey, 1958, 7 Utah
2d 137, 320 P. 2d 653, and Globe Mining Co. v. Anderson,
Wyo. 318 P. 2d 373.
Keeping in mind that technical prospecting methods,
such as the use of counters and scintillators, are only exploration tools and not complete exploration and discovery
systems, we hold that here radiometric results coupled
with the other evidence, such as assay and type of rock in
place show an overall
fair compliance with the statute
38
requiring discovery.
Justice Hall, in his dissent to the Dallas opinion disputes the
majority belief that this conclusion is not "unrealistic." The dissent
expresses the belief that the majority opinion is revolutionary in
the result it reaches as far as the discovery requirement of the
mining law is concerned. In his dissent Justice Hall said:
I respectfully submit that a Geiger counter, no matter
what its reading may be, does not prove mineral in place.
Without discovery of mineralized rock in place there can
be no valid location of a lode claim, no matter what the
Geiger counter readings may be.
The effect of the majority opinion is to substitute for
proof of a discovery of mineral in place a mere possibility,
38 Id. at 204, 323 P.2d at 279 (Emphasis added).
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probability or conjecture of mineral in place, and thus
judicially legislate that there need not be an actual and
proven discovery to have a valid claim.
The legal effect of the decision is to authorize unlimited
filings based on one actual legal discovery. If such a result
is desirable then it is a matter for the legislature and not
for the courts 9
A short time after the Dallas decision was rendered the Nevada
Supreme Court reached a similar result in the case of Berto v.
Wilson.40 The Nevada court held that the use of a scintillator and a
mineral light on outcrop samples plus the prior mining and prospecting experience of the locator was sufficient to meet the discovery
requirements.
In the Globe case the Wyoming court intimated that although
geophysical data "alone" would not be accepted as proof of "valid
discovery," geophysical data plus something else might be accepted.
That this thought was in the mind of the Wyoming court is evidenced by its decision in the Western Standard case, 4' decided in
1960, three years after Globe.
The facts in Western Standard are as follows: On June 30,
1954, Thurston's predecessors in interest located and staked claims
XYZ #1-13 in the Gas Hills of Wyoming. The claims were located
on a trend discovered by considering the geology of the area and
by chemically assaying numerous samples taken from adjoining
and adjacent claims. At or shortly after location, discovery pits
were dug on all claims. Radiometric readings were taken in each
pit and each produced readings of 2-4 times background. Between
June 26 and July 2, 1957, a drill hole was completed on each claim .12
Each hole was probed with a radiometric device which recorded
emissions of rays from uranium ores. Samples of the cuttings of
each hole were taken but were not chemically assayed until after
the present case came to trial. Thurston's predecessors in interest
maintained possession of the claims from the time of location until
October 9 or 10, 1957, when agents of Western Standard Uranium
Co. entered thereon, posted location notices and commenced work,
claiming that the location of Thurston was void because of failure
to comply with Wyoming and Federal discovery statutes. Thurston
then brought a quiet title action which was decided in his favor in
both the trial court and the Wyoming Supreme Court.
Western Standard claimed on appeal that the facts were insufficient to sustain a finding of discovery and that the trial court
must have based its finding or discovery on radiometric readings
and conjecture. As authority for this contention Western Standard
Uranium Co. relied on the Globe case. The Wyoming Supreme Court
rejected this and distinguished this case from Globe in the following
manner:
There is no reason to conclude that the trial court based
its findings upon any particular one of these evidentiary
facts nor is there any reason to believe that the court
39 Id. at 207, 323 P.2d at 280 (Emphasis added).
40 See note 1, supra.
41 Western Standard Uranium Co. v. Thurston, 355 P.2d 377 (Wyo. 1960).
42 Drill holes were completed after passage of the Wyoming Drill Hole Law and were apparently
a precautionary measure on the part of Thurston's predecessors. See Wyo. Stats. § 30-6 (1957).
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should or did ignore the many combined pertinent facts
and factors which were disclosed by the plaintiff's showing
on the motion for summary judgment and which definitely,
on the
facts herein, distinguishes this case from the Globe
43
case.

The court further explains in language that should earn for
it a warm spot forever in the hearts of geologists and geophysicists,
the reasoning behind its decision when it says:
It may be conceded that a discovery could not be based
on any one of the above facts but they are all relevant facts
which should be considered as component parts of an assemblage of physical facts which might and would "justify
a reasonably prudent man in expending money and effort
in further exploration or development." For this court to
rule otherwise would require it to adopt a position that a
man or men engaging in a specialized business can never
be a reasonably prudent man unless their methods and
operations follow the court's concept of the proper manner
of conducting their business and substituting the judgment
44
of the court for experts in their respective fields.
The court after referring to other cases that have treated this
same problem continues by saying:
While no case examined allows the predicating of a
discovery solely on radiometric readings, the importance
of such readings, when taken into consideration with other
facts and factors, is universally recognized. To fail to do
so is to deny progress or recognize that scientific tools by
continued use and experience can and usually do evolve
from unreliability to respected
accuracy when properly
45
applied to their ultimate uses.
The result of this case is to declare valid claims in which there
was, at the time of location, no "actual discovery of mineral in rock
in place." There had been no chemical assays, until much later,
to show mineral content within the boundaries of the claims. The
entire discovery was based on what previously had been held to
be mere indications of mineral. Discovery evidence here consisted
of a trend discovered by application of geological theory and assays
taken from nearby claims known to contain uranium, Geiger counter readings from discovery pits on each claim, and the fact that the
discovery pits exposed a geological formation known to be the only
uranium bearing formation in the area. Radiometric well logs taken
some time after location and chemical assays of samples taken
from drill holes, which were not assayed until after the case had
gone to trial, were used by the court only as additional proof of
what the original discovery had already proven.
This case may well become a landmark case in the area of the
discovery requirement in mining law. It stands for the proposition
that geophysical evidences of minerals are no longer to be considered as "mere indications" of mineral but can, when accompanied
by other indications of mineral that substantiate the conclusions
derived from the geophysical evidence, be treated as equal to a
43 Id. at 382 (Emphasis added).
44 Id. at 382.
45 Id. at 382.
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finding of mineral in place in a vein or lode and thus be the basis
for a valid mineral discovery as required by state and federal
statutes.
IV.

CONCLUSION

No longer is it absolutely essential to have an actual discovery
of mineral in place in a vein or lode in order to have a valid location.
At least this is true for location of lode claims for radioactive
minerals. A chronological examination of the cases treated'here
shows this to be true. In Smaller v. Leach,46 decided in 1957, the
Colorado court in some dicta in its opinion outlined the general
rule that mere indications cannot form the basis of a valid discovery
of mineral but rather there must be an actual discovery of mineral
in a vein or lode of rock in place. The court also stated in this dicta
that if this policy were to be changed, and the court indicated
that it felt it would have to be changed before geophysical evidence
could be used as a basis for a discovery, it would be for the legislature to change and not the courts.
Later in 1957, the Wyoming Supreme Court, in its Globe Mining 47 decision, followed the general rule by refusing to allow claims
to stand in which there had been no actual discovery of mineral.
The court gave an indication of what was to come, however, when
it emphasized in its opinion that it would not accept as valid a
discovery in which geophysical data was the "only test" and that
geophysical data "alone" was not sufficient to support discovery.
Modification of the general rule requiring actual discovery of
mineral before there was valid discovery occurred when the Colorado Supreme Court, in a decision that Justice Hall in his dissent
calls revolutionary, decided the Dallas case 48 early in 1958. In that
case the court apparently forgot the belief it expressed earlier in
Smaller v. Leach,49 that the job of changing the discovery requirement so as to permit the use of geophysical data belonged to the
legislature and did a bit of legislating on its own. The court most
certainly was influenced by the Wyoming and Utah courts as the
opinion refers to both the Globe and Rummell decisions.5 0 The court
in effect agreed with the Globe case and held that geophysical
evidence alone is not enough to establish a valid discovery, but
geophysical evidence plus something else is enough. The Colorado
court said that "something else" must be a valid physical discovery
of mineral in place on at least one of the claims in question and
that the other claims from which no assays are obtained must be
in similar rock or along the same vein or lode as the one from
which the assay has been obtained. The court concluded that with
that combination of facts it is not unrealistic to hold there is
compliance with the discovery statutes.5 1
The final step in this transition was taken by Wyoming in the
Western Standard case.52 That decision was the "coup de grace" of
46
47
48
49
50
51
52

See
See
See
See
See
See
See

note
note
note
note
note
note
note

31,
33,
36,
31,
38,
38,
41.

supra.
supro.
supra.
supra.
supra.
supro.
supro.

DENVER LAW CENTER JOURNAL

VOL.

XL

the long adhered to and staunchly defended rule that where there
is no actual mineral present there is no discovery and its counterpart that the indications of a thing no matter how strong are not
the thing itself and thus mere indications of mineral cannot constitute a valid discovery.
In Western Standard the court went one step further than the
Colorado court had gone in Dallas. Dallas held that there had to be
at least one actual discovery of mineral in place, at least one of the
claims in question had to have a chemical assay showing mineral,
which the Colorado court had earlier stated was the conclusive
test. But Western Standard declared valid thirteen claims none of
which had had an assay made on a sample until well after the case
had gone to trial and then the court, in overruling a motion not to
allow entry of such assays as evidence, said that such assays only
corroborated the earlier discovery. The earlier discovery was based
entirely on evidence that would, under the rule of Nevada Sierra
Oil Co. v. Home Oil Co. 53 and other similar cases, have been classified as "mere indications." The discovery relied on in Western
Standard and declared valid by the Wyoming court was based on
Geiger counter readings, geological deductions, assays from neighboring claims of proven worth, the fact that the geological formation cut by the discovery pits was known to be the only uranium
bearing formation in the area, and customs or practice of the miners
in the area.
The result of this case is a very practical one. The courts still
will not accept as valid discovery based entirely on geophysical
evidence. It is felt that not even the mining people would advocate
such a ruling as they, much more than the lawyers and judges, are
aware of the failings and shortcomings of these technical devices.
But, at the same time, information obtained by the use of such
instruments, which have over the years proven themselves to be
accurate the great majority of the time, should not be completely
ignored when corroborated by additional facts and indications. The
result of this case will allow such information to be used to prove
discovery.
Mining law has been criticized as outmoded and in need of
reform. 54 It is contended that because of obsolete laws the mining
industry is prevented from fully utilizing modern technological
advancements. The modification of the mining law, resulting from
the decisions in these several recent cases should aid in removing
some of those obstructions, at least as regards discovery based on
geophysical data. It is felt that the Western Standard case will become a landmark case in this area and provides an excellent indication of what it takes to establish a valid discovery of mineral when
the main evidence of such discovery is geophysical information.
This modification of the mining law should result in greater reliance
on geophysical and other scientific methods of discovery, greater
confidence in the legal validity of resulting discoveries, and thus a
greater benefit to the mineral industry and the country.
53 See note 23, supra.
54 Martz, Pick and ShoVel Mining Low in an Atomic Age: A Case for Reform, 27 Rocky Mt. L.
Rev. 375 (1955).

